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ABSTRACT
In this article, I argue that to combat the over-delegation of power
to military tribunals, some limiting principles must exist to prevent
prejudiced and unwarranted second-chance prosecutions. The United
States’ criminal justice system purports to embrace sturdy protections
against double jeopardy, meaning no person shall be tried twice for the same
offense. Yet, this ideal is far from the reality. In a legal system governed by
various, distinct sovereigns, prosecutors often have two, or more,
opportunities to try a case. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
this reality in Gamble v. United States, 1 which left service members
particularly vulnerable to successive prosecutions in military courts.
This degradation of protection against repeated prosecution
requires intervention from the Department of Defense (DOD). In this
article, I seek to demonstrate that under the current system, double jeopardy
exposure is a compounding threat to service member’s legal rights.
Consequently, this article proposes several limiting principles to minimize
the use of successive prosecutions and enhance protections for service
members during court-martial proceedings. Collective confidence in the
legal system demands that when a service member’s liberty is on the line,
every precaution be taken to protect against unjust and imbalanced
successive trials.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Austin Greening, a twenty-four-year-old freshly enlisted sailor, saw
an unfortunate and devastating mistake propel him down a hole of endless
litigation, characterized by multiple guilty pleas and calculated tactics meant
to keep him imprisoned for an extended time across multiple jurisdictions. 2
Greening was tried and convicted in Virginia state court for the accidental
death of a fellow sailor. 3 New evidence was introduced before sentencing,
so Greening was tried again, entered a guilty plea for voluntary
139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
See generally United States v. Greening, No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2018). See also Joseph Darius Jaafari, Do Soldiers Face ‘Double
Jeopardy’ in Military Courts?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/04/30/do-soldiers-face-double-jeopardy-inmilitary-courts [https://perma.cc/S2K2-3RRK].
See Brock Vergakis, After State Trial and Prison Time, Military Judge Sends Norfolk Sailor
Who Killed Friend Back Behind Bars, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:00 PM),
https://www.pilotonline.com/military/article_ee90d2c3-ac5d-5b51-9997b58d2df0651b.html [https://perma.cc/EZ3B-JKJB].
1
2

3
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manslaughter, and served a six-month sentence. 4 The victim’s family and
the Navy were unsatisfied with this sentence. 5 To atone for what they
believed to be an overly lenient sentence, the Navy opted to charge
Greening with murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 6 Thus, once Greening was released from civilian prison, he was
immediately placed in the brig 7 to await his next trial. 8 If convicted, Greening
might have faced life in prison on military murder charges. 9 Instead, he was
sentenced to another three and a half years in military prison. 10 To a layman,
this might appear, on its face, a clear violation of the prohibition against
double jeopardy, but legal technicalities deem it perfectly permissible.
While this is certainly an unsettling loophole, it is one the U.S. Supreme
Court continues to uphold. This article will explore this unique exception
to traditional conceptions of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
A fundamental precept to the notion of American liberty is that no
person shall be tried twice for the same offense. 11 Yet, in a complex
federalism system, this seemingly simple sentiment is far too good to be
true. In a legal system governed by various, distinct sovereigns, the old
maxim that prosecutors only get one bite at the apple is little more than
folklore. While the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the false narrative
around double jeopardy in Gamble v. United States, 12 it left a glaring and
often forgotten hole in its analysis: successive trials under the military justice
system.
Since the passage of the Articles of War in 1776, Congress sought
to insulate military courts from civilian control, noting that military justice is
virtually inseparable from military discipline—a wholly distinct entity from
civilian courts. 13 At America’s founding, a system permitting a service
member to be tried by both court-martial and a state criminal court for the
same criminal act, let alone nonmilitary criminal conduct, could not possibly
have been fathomed. The post-World War II expansion of military
4
5
6

Id.
Id.
See Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *2 (detailing steps taken by Greening’s command to

extend Greening’s active duty status to keep him within UCMJ jurisdiction).
A brig is a temporary place of confinement—akin to a jail cell—where Navy sailors or Marines
are placed when accused of a crime. See, e.g., Austin Rooney, In the Slammer: Special
Programs, Brig Duty, ALL HANDS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://allhands.navy.mil/Stories/DisplayStory/Article/1840462/in-the-slammer/ [https://perma.cc/5C75-99XJ].
Vergakis, supra note 3.
7

8
9

10

Id.
Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019) (holding that prosecution by a separate sovereign is not
considered a prosecution for the “same offence” and, therefore, does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
See JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (1992).
11
12

13
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authority to try service members for civilian crimes undermines the
congressional intent of Article I, which provides Congress with the ability to
make rules governing the armed forces and for trying military cases. 14 The
implications of this expansion of power have been largely ignored, allowing
the military unfettered authority to retry service members by court-martial
for offenses receiving an unsatisfactory result in state court. Left unchecked,
this power severely limits the rights of active duty, reserve, and retired
members of the armed forces.
In Gamble, the Supreme Court upheld the separate sovereigns
doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 15 thereby
perpetuating a legal loophole undermining the individual liberties of its
citizens—particularly service members of the armed forces. This article first
analyzes the historical development of the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause and separate sovereigns doctrine during the preratification
founding of the American military justice system. 16 Next, it provides an
overview of the Court’s reasoning for upholding the separate sovereigns
doctrine in Gamble, as well as the counterarguments from Justices Ginsburg
and Gorsuch who called for its invalidation. 17 In analyzing these criticisms, I
seek to explore the evolution of these principles from their origination to
their modern practice, particularly through the lens of military justice.
Consequently, this article will argue that the Court’s decision in Gamble fails
to recognize the unique implications arising from successive prosecutions in
military courts, which effectively authorizes a compounded loss of service
members’ rights. 18 I argue that to combat the over-delegation of power to
military tribunals, some limiting principle must exist to prevent prejudiced
and unwarranted second bites at the apple by partial adjudicators. 19
II.

BACKGROUND

This part provides context for the siloed development of both the
separate sovereigns doctrine and the origins of military justice. It first
discusses the evolution of double jeopardy jurisprudence and the
establishment of the separate sovereigns doctrine—a doctrine developed in
14

See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 936–73

(2015).
15
16

Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1976.
See infra part II.

17

See infra part III.

18

See infra part IV.

19

See infra part V.
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a counter-textual fashion in light of the Fifth Amendment’s construction and
congressional intent. It then explores the independent development of the
military justice system and early exploration of double jeopardy principles
within the framework of separate sovereignty.

A.

Fifth Amendment

The text of the Fifth Amendment reads: “No person shall . . . be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 20
The traditional understanding of the notion that individuals should be free
from multiple prosecutions for the same offense has a long and storied
history. 21 As Justice Hugo Black noted, “[f]ear and abhorrence of
governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the
oldest ideas found in western civilization.” 22 Colonial enactments,
established prior to the passage of the Fifth Amendment, either fully
incorporated the rights, liberties, and immunities afforded to the subjects of
England—which included a prohibition against double jeopardy—or
established their own provisions precluding it. 23 These early enactments
were often codified into state law prohibitions prior to the formal adoption
of the Fifth Amendment in 1791. 24
While the text of the constitutional amendment provides a
seemingly comprehensible understanding of the strictures and dictates of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, there has been substantial debate about the
practical application of the clause. Early modern jurisprudence on the
matter has indicated the important place double jeopardy has on the
contemporary practice of law. For example, in Green v. United States, the
Court, in dicta, offered:
[T] he constitutional prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than
once for an alleged offense. . . . [T]he State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense. 25
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See David S. Rudenstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against
Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 197–99 (2005).
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Connecticut all adopted some form of prohibition against
double jeopardy in their colonial enactments. See Rudenstein, supra note 21, at 221–22.
The states that codified prohibitions against double jeopardy through case law, statute, or
constitutional amendment included New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Rudenstein, supra note 21, at 223–26.
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
20
21

22
23

24

25
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According to this understanding, such actions on behalf of the State are
“contrary to both the letter and spirit” of the clause. 26
Alternatively, uncertainty over the meaning and parameters of the
clause results from questions as to whether the protections from double
jeopardy intend to defend individuals from cumulative punishment or the
harassment of multiple trials. 27 This uncertainty and lack of uniformity
between early decisions and modern interpretations led to inconsistent
holdings where successive prosecutions have become paramount issues. 28
Despite the commanding language of the Fifth Amendment, there
is a long-recognized exception to the double jeopardy prohibition: the
separate sovereigns doctrine. Essentially, the nature of federalism mandates
that states and the federal government exist in separate, mutually exclusive
spheres. 29 Yet, one of the foundational debates during the ratification period
was whether the states and the federal government were to be considered a
hybrid-sovereign system or, alternatively, part of “one whole.” 30 Ultimately,
the prevailing argument was that, while states were considered exclusive in
their own right, it was equally important that separate sovereignty
incorporate a “balance between the national and State governments . . . [to]
form a double security for the people.” 31
This security breaks down where schemes form and evolve in ways
that were inconceivable pre- and early post-ratification. For example,
concurrent criminal statutes disrupt the distribution of authority between
the federal and state governments. 32 This concept raises peripheral
questions as to the ability of the federal system to balance rights. 33 However,
this problem is not limited to a federal-state overlay. 34 A unique and often
overlooked area where concurrent jurisdiction poses similar complications
is between state or federal jurisdiction and the military justice system’s
jurisdiction.
Id. at 198.
See LEONARD G. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 (1968).
See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1197–99 (2004) (explaining historical
26
27
28

inconsistencies in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause).
See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 53, 60–61 (1987).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander
Hamilton).
See BERGER, supra note 29, at 63.
Because of the Supremacy Clause, concurrent state statutes tend to be preempted by
federal laws—particularly where concurrent jurisdiction is at issue. See Joshua M. Devine,
Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 127, 144 (2020).
See MILLER, supra note 27, at 5.
This issue was considered most acute where the conduct offended multiple systems or laws,
which created concurrent problems among the jurisdictions. See Comment, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1965).
29
30

31
32

33
34
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Origination of Military Justice

The presence of military court-martial proceedings predates the
discovery of the Americas. 35 From the “Court of Chivalry” to the “Articles
of War,” there has long been an understanding that crimes committed by
soldiers were subject to military jurisdiction. 36 These authorities inspired the
American colonies to propagate their versions of the Articles of War. 37
While concerned with the impending revolution, the philosophical
viewpoints shaping the construction of these Articles focused more squarely
on building a functional military justice system with mechanisms to control
and discipline members within its ranks. 38
In its earliest days of development, the military justice system
oscillated between civilian principles, constitutional values, and culturally
ingrained military structures. 39 As a result, unique procedures and
punishments arose for discipline-specific violations. 40 However, this system
was not settled with an eye toward expanding a military tribunal’s jurisdiction
over conventional crimes. 41 Rather, questions surrounding civilian
supervisory capacity over these proceedings raised additional issues
regarding the role of military tribunals. 42 While boundaries between the
military justice system and its civilian counterpart do exist, it is firmly
established that military courts both derive power independent of their
civilian counterparts and that their authority arises from the Constitution
itself. 43
This section analyzes the foundational origins of military justice and
military courts. It then seeks to elaborate upon the innate distinctions
between military and civilian courts. Next, this section assesses the pivotal
role Grafton v. United States played in early common law conceptions of
Lt. Col. J.D. Droddy, USAF (Ret.), King Richard to Solorio: The Historical and
Constitutional Bases for Court-Martial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, 30 A.F. L. REV. 91, 92

35

(1989).

See id. at 91–95 (listing historical jurisdiction expectations of military members).
Id. at 95–96.
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 3.
See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 654 (2003).
36
37
38
39

Additional procedures in place allow for nonjudicial punishment through mechanisms like
administrative boards, summary courts-martial, and bad-conduct discharges for specific,
service-related charges. See id. at 713.
Id. Specifically, Turley critiqued the collateral areas in which the military justice system has
taken over governance. Id. at 661–62. One such area concerns what he calls “troubling
questions of both the necessity and legitimacy of military jurisdiction.” Id. at 654.
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 6.
Capt. Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of Military
Tribunals: A Study, Critique, & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10
(2005).
40

41

42
43
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the separate sovereigns doctrine—specifically in the military context. 44
Finally, it provides an overview of the substantial expansion of military court
jurisdiction and the implications that expansion has had on successive
prosecutions.

1.

Foundational Roots

During the foundational days of the American nation, then
Commander in Chief, George Washington, called for revisions to the
Articles of War, originally crafted by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. 45
By 1776, Congress established what became known as the military courtmartial. 46 In fact, the processes governing court-martial practice already
underwent several revisions prior to the ratification of the United States
Constitution. 47 While the system was well-established by the time the
Constitution was ratified, the use of the court-martial was limited by the
government’s constitutional authority to convene them. 48
The constitutional authority to create the pre-existing military
courts is arguably derived from two distinct sources in the Constitution: (1)
Article I, Section Eight, Clause Fourteen; 49 and (2) Article II, Section Two,
Clause One. 50 While ascertaining exactly where the constitutional authority
for military courts originates is difficult, it certainly does not fall within the
ambit of Article III. 51
Despite their establishment under the authority of the federal
system through the ratification of the Constitution, very little about the

44

206 U.S. 333 (1907).

See LURIE, supra note 13, at 4–5.
See id.
See id. The original revisions to the 1775 Articles of War—as they were known at the time—
were prompted by then-General George Washington who considered them insufficient. Id.
45
46
47

at 4–5. The 1776 revisions were the first in a series of revisions that established the military
court-martial and outlined due process considerations within the framework of military
discipline. Id. at 5–6. Finally, Congress adopted procedural changes in 1786, just before
ratification of the Constitution, that included cross-examination and a Court of Inquiry. Id.
at 8–9.
See Baldrate, supra note 43, at 10.
See id. This Article gives Congress the power “to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
See id. at 12. Article II provides power to the President as an independent authority to
agglomerate all military trials and tribunals. It makes the President the “Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,” and, therefore, court-martial are to be
considered a tool to assist Presidents in their constitutional capacity to maintain good order
and discipline within the forces. Id. at 12 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
See id. at 6–7, 14. This is important because the Constitution requires that Article III courts
hear all cases and controversies, thereby limiting the jurisdiction of military courts, which do
not garner the same constitutional respect as other courts. Id. at 14–15.
48
49

50

51
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Articles of War changed during the nation’s early years. 52 Some material
changes occurred following major wars, with the greatest revisions taking
place after World War II, including the formation of the UCMJ and
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). 53 This modification to the Articles of
War served as a catalyst for the modern expansion of military justice
jurisdiction. 54 It is this expansion, in particular, that has further blurred the
line between the military and civilian systems of justice.

2.

Separation from the Civilian System

The United States Supreme Court accepts that the military system
is a “separate community” with limited overlap with the typical functioning
of the civilian justice system. 55 Indeed, from conception, both Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams intended and supported a system of military
justice that was “admittedly severe” based on the principle that “governance
of the military was based on needs very different from those of a civilian
polity.” 56 Adams’s notion of military justice as a lone entity, separate and
distinct from civilian proceedings, reinforced much of the early decisionmaking about congressional interference with military justice practice. 57
There was an inherent perception of danger in the idea of military
encroachment into civil and political rights; therefore, the sharp separation
of the two was necessary to preclude such a threat. 58 General William
Tecumseh Sherman, head of the Army following the Civil War, recognized
the danger of allowing civilian laws and values to seep into the governance
of military justice. 59 He argued that contaminating military law with civilian
principles would ultimately threaten and “weaken” military culture as a
whole, 60 though the same precept operates in reverse as well.
52
53

See Droddy, supra note 35, at 98–99.
See id. at 99–100. The UCMJ and MCM were both created through an Executive Order

issued by President Harry Truman in 1951. Particularly, the MCM sought to “clarif[y] the
customary relationship between military articles and the civil law.” Id. at 100 (citing Exec.
Order No. 10,214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (Feb. 8, 1951)).
See id. at 98–99.
James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen’s
Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 177–78 (1984).
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 5. Here, an analysis of a handful of the framers’ intentions in
drafting a Constitution where the military system was wholly distinct provides context for
perceptions of the time. Id. at 5. This sets the framework to understand how the system
developed.
Id. at 6.
Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
305, 331 (2015).
See Turley, supra note 39, at 651.
See id. at 651–52. This vision was supported by the Supreme Court at the time as well. Id.
at 652.
54
55

56

57
58

59
60
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“Procedural informalities” deemed permissible in military tribunals
would otherwise be considered insufficient in typical civilian courts. 61 These
informalities, which carried over from common law edicts of military
justice, 62 provide fodder for the argument that civilian legal concepts
remained outside the purview of military jurisdiction.

3.

Grafton v. United States

This section shifts to an overview of the civilian conception of
successive prosecution and its place in military justice jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Grafton, while consistent with early common
law conceptions of separate sovereignty, stood in contrast to a line of thenrecently decided cases that altered the jurisprudential tides away from a
general fear of successive prosecutions. 63 Rather than ignoring widely
recognized doctrines governing the prohibition against successive
prosecutions by dissimilar sovereigns, Grafton distinguishes that, where
offenses are similar in “substantial respect” and have already been tried in a
competent jurisdiction, subsequent trials serve no utility and may be
discarded. 64
Grafton involved the court-martial of a service member in the
Philippines for murder. 65 The soldier was acquitted and subsequently
retried in a local court for the same offense. 66 The second trial resulted in a
guilty verdict and a sentence of twelve years and a day. 67 Grafton argued
before the Supreme Court that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from
double jeopardy was violated, which led the Court to reverse the
conviction. 68 In so finding, the Court reasoned:
[W]e rest our decision . . . upon the broad ground that the
same acts constituting a crime against the United States
cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused in a
court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a
second trial of the accused for that crime in the same or in
another court, civil or military of the same government. 69

Margulies, supra note 58, at 335.
Such informalities initially included the lack of counsel for the defendant. Furthermore,
there were fewer mechanisms to temper harsh punishments. Id. at 335.
See generally Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560
(1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847).
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 355 (1907).
Id. at 333.
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 79 (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 351–52).
See id. (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 344).
See id. (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 345).
Grafton, 206 U.S. at 352.
61
62

63

64
65
66
67
68
69
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This holding rests on the general notion that prohibiting double jeopardy,
through the Constitution or an act of Congress in civilian courts, must apply
equally to court-martial proceedings—a comparably competent
jurisdiction. 70

4.

Expansion of Jurisdictional Power

Modern developments in the UCMJ expanded the jurisdiction of
military courts to permit the prosecution of nearly all crimes committed by
service members—in their civilian capacity or otherwise. 71 This expansion
usurped the idea that the military justice system was primarily focused on
maintaining discipline and order and instead allowed Congress, through its
plenary power over the military, to extend criminal subject-matter
jurisdiction to military courts over both common law and statutorily defined
felonies. 72
Previously, the Court ruled in O’Callahan v. Parker that service
members could not be tried by court-martial for non-service-related
offenses. 73 The Court, in handing down this decision, provided:
A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part
of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved . . . . But the justification for such a system rests
on the special needs of the military, and history teaches that
expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
carries with it a threat to liberty . . . . “There are dangers
lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided
by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution.” 74
However, this understanding of the jurisdictional limitations inherent to
court-martial proceedings was shortly abolished in Solorio v. United States, 75
which extended the scope of charges that could be brought against military
personnel, including those without a direct link to military discipline. 76 The
abolition of the distinction between service-connected crimes and non-

See id. (holding that where an individual is tried for an offense in any court that derives its
authority from the United States—regardless of conviction or acquittal—that individual may
not be tried again for that same offense).
Note, Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1910 (1991).
Id. at 1914–16. This expansion was temporarily curbed in O’Callahan v. Parker, wherein
the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding military courts’ ability to handle the
“subtleties of constitutional law.” Id. at 1916 (quoting 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)).
395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969).
Id. at 265 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955)).
483 U.S. 435 (1987).
See Margulies, supra note 58, at 341.
70

71
72

73
74
75
76
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service-connected offenses was predicated upon the belief that doing so
“was a futile enterprise” and difficult to administer in practice. 77
This expansion broke down the dividing line between military and
civilian courts, allowing military courts to procure greater power in deciding
cases. Not only was the expansion codified in the UCMJ and MCM,
through defined criminal articles, it was also enshrined in Article 134 (the
General Article), 78 which allowed for the assimilation of state laws and
permitted the prosecution of such offenses under federal law. 79 This rapidly
expanded the power and jurisdiction of court-martial proceedings to reach
crimes and offenses that never would have been fathomed by the
Constitutional framers during the early days of the nation.
The robust expansion of the military justice system and its
jurisdictional capacity has opened the door to lengthy debates about the
fairness and veracity of the process. This substantial jurisdictional overlap,
compounded with newly emerging understandings of double jeopardy’s
relation to separate sovereignty, led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
in Gamble v. United States in 2018.
III. GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court heard arguments in Gamble v. United States
in December 2018 and announced its decision in June 2019. 80 Rather than
upend the present conception of “offence” and dual sovereignty, the Court
found in favor of preserving the status quo—permitting continued successive
prosecutions in state and federal courts. 81 This part provides an overview of
the Court’s decision, beginning with a brief recitation Gamble’s facts and
procedural history. The next section analyzes the majority opinion,
authored by Justice Alito, and discusses the majority’s rationale for
preserving the separate sovereigns doctrine as it relates to double jeopardy.
Then, the subsequent section briefly surveys Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion expressing his reservations about the use of stare decisis as a general
principle of judicial decision-making. The final section of this part examines
Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice Gorsuch’s separate dissents, which this article
expands upon in subsequent parts. 82

77
78
79
80
81
82

See id. at 342.

19 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
Id. at 1980.
See infra part III.
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Facts

As the adage goes, “if you want something done right, do it
yourself.” This logic drove federal prosecutors to indict Terance Martez
Gamble for a felon-in-possession offense despite his guilty plea to a similar
charge in Alabama state court. 83 In November 2015, an Alabama police
officer pulled Gamble over for a damaged headlight before the officer
allegedly detected the odor of marijuana permeating from Gamble’s
vehicle. 84 Having established probable cause to search the vehicle, the officer
uncovered a loaded 9-mm handgun. 85 Gamble had a prior second-degree
robbery conviction, which prohibited him from possessing a firearm under
both Alabama and federal law. 86 The subsequent federal prosecution was
authorized by the long-standing doctrine permitting prosecutions by
different sovereigns—in this case, state and federal—and, thereby, did not
implicate double jeopardy concerns. 87

B.

Procedural History

Gamble believed he was being charged twice for the same act. 88 He
moved to dismiss the federal indictment on the grounds that it was brought
for “the same offense” for which he had already been convicted in an
Alabama state court. 89 Gamble argued that the federal indictment violated
his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 90
The federal district court denied his motion to dismiss based on
precedent indicating two offenses are not considered the “same offense” if
they are prosecuted on behalf of different sovereigns. 91 Following the district
court’s denial, Gamble plead guilty to the federal felon-in-possession
offense, but he preserved the double jeopardy challenge for appeal. 92 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal—approving the conviction on separate
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
Id.
Id.
Id. Alabama code specifically provided that “no one convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ ‘shall
own a firearm or have one in his or her possession.’” Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a)

83
84
85
86

(2015)). The corresponding federal law—criminalizing the same act as a separate “offense”—
prohibits those convicted of some felony-level offenses from “ship[ping] or transport[ing] in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition.” 18.U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018).
The rationale, espoused by earlier courts, noted that prosecution for two offenses (one
under federal law and one under state law) necessarily implicated two distinct offenses
charged against the defendant. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.

87

88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985)).
Id.
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sovereignty grounds. 93 Gamble then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
forbids successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns. 94

C.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and
Kavanaugh joined. 95 In affirming the Eleventh Circuit decision, the Court
determined “[e]liminating the dual-sovereignty rule . . . would not even
prevent many successive state and federal prosecutions” derived from the
same criminal act so long as they are defined by statutory elements. 96
Justice Alito began by extrapolating whether the Court should
overrule the long-standing separate sovereigns doctrine of the Double
Jeopardy Clause—specifically noting the complexity of double jeopardy
jurisprudence. 97 Ultimately, Justice Alito pointed to three seminal cases to
ground his separate sovereign, separate-interest argument, leading to his
conclusion that the “duality of harm explains how ‘one act’ could constitute
‘two offences, for each of which [the offender] is justly punishable.’” 98
In crafting a historical analysis of the “170 years of precedent” on
double jeopardy, Justice Alito cabined his inquiry to avoid the founding-era
conception of the right to protection from double jeopardy. 99 Rather, he
focused on the doctrinal development presented in three seminal cases: Fox
v. Ohio, 100 United States v. Marigold, 101 and Moore v. Illinois. 102 These cases,
Justice Alito asserted, spell out the foundational principles of the separate
sovereigns doctrine. 103
First, Fox held that the class of crime and its impact on public safety
might require separate and distinct prosecutions. 104 As a corollary to this
understanding, Marigold contemplated that “the same act might, as to its
character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an
offence against both state and federal governments,” thus permitting
Id. In Gamble, the Court used the verbiage “dual-sovereignty” doctrine. For the purposes
of this article, the terms dual-sovereignty and separate sovereignty are interchangeable.
Id. at 1964–65.
Id. at 1960.
Id. at 1980.
Id. at 1963–64.
Id. at 1967 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 (1852)).
Id. at 1964. Gamble focused the majority of his argument on original conceptions of double
jeopardy and English common law perceptions regarding the right.
46 U.S. 410 (1847).
50 U.S. 560 (1850).
55 U.S. 13 (1852).
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966.
Id. (citing Fox, 46 U.S. at 435).
93

94
95
96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104
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separate penalties to attach from both entities. 105 This notion was expanded
further in Moore, where the Court outlined the purported legal distinction
between the “the same act” and “the same offence.” 106 Abstractly, the Court
stated a single act could be the source of the violation of the law (an offense)
of two separate sovereigns, making the singular act punishable by both. 107
The Court then argued that the standard derived from these cases
was firmly cemented in its United States v. Lanza decision. 108 In Lanza, the
Court held that an act designated “as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
punished by each.” 109 Justice Alito and the Court found that Gamble’s
original intent early common law argument could not overcome the weight
of stare decisis. 110 It expressly rejected the conception that incorporating the
Double Jeopardy Clause against the States effectively abrogates the
application of the separate sovereigns doctrine. 111 Instead, the Court held
that a broad dual-sovereignty doctrine continued to exist as a backdrop to
Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence, despite the incorporation of the
Fifth Amendment. 112
Finally, Justice Alito expressed that eliminating the separate
sovereign doctrine would not narrow the reach of federal criminal law, nor
would it fundamentally alter the legal conception of “offence” for double
jeopardy purposes. 113 Overturning this long-standing doctrine would require
the Court to ignore stare decisis and undergo a revolutionary recalculation
of federalism and basic criminal conduct principles. 114

D. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the result but writing
separately to address his view on the veracity and proper application of stare
105
106
107

See id. (quoting Marigold, 50 U.S. at 569).
See id. (citing Moore, 55 U.S. at 14).
Moore, 55 U.S. at 20. The Gamble Court further extrapolated that “[a]n assault on a

United States marshal . . . would offend against the Nation and a State” by “‘hindering’ the
‘execution of legal process,’ and the second by ‘breach[ing]’ the ‘peace of the State.’”
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966–67 (quoting Moore, 55 U.S. at 20).
260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382). This argument rests on the
distinction between “the people of a State” and “the people of all the States,” even though
each derives its power from the same source: the people. Id. at 1999 n.26 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 1978.
This is expressly argued to combat the analogy to the silver-platter doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment, which aptly applies to the separate sovereignty exception to the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1978–79.
See id. at 1979.
See id. at 1980.
108
109

110
111

112
113
114

See id.
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He agreed with Justice Alito that the historical record of the
separate sovereignty doctrine did not justify overhauling the settled
exception. 116 However, Justice Thomas asserted the Court’s reliance on stare
decisis did not comport with Article III because it justified the supremacy
of clearly erroneous decisions over the literal text of the Constitution and
federal statutory law. 117 Justice Thomas’s concern involved the movement
toward federal common law, under the guise of stare decisis, and away from
the three bodies of federal positive law: “the Constitution; federal statutes,
rules, and regulations; and treaties.” 118 He asserted that interpreting the law
as a judicial duty requires “adherence to the original meaning of the text,”
and not a blind adherence to demonstrably erroneous precedent. 119

E.

115

Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. Her overarching
concern was that the majority permitted Gamble’s liberty to be depleted
based on a “metaphysical subtlety” known as the separate sovereigns
doctrine. 120 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the focus on English common law
to ascertain whether foreign judgments would bar successive state or federal
prosecutions was misguided. 121 Instead, the focus should have been on the
basic tenants of the construction of the federal system itself: those of a
“compound republic.” 122
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the precedent relied upon by the
majority to uphold the existence of the separate sovereigns doctrine was
derived from outdated dicta. 123 Furthermore, she stressed that stare decisis
should not command when a case “concern[s] procedural rules that

115
116
117

Id. at 1980–81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, there will always be a “tempt[ation] for judges

to confuse [their] own preferences with the requirements of the law” (citing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting))).
See id. at 1980–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1989 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas still concluded Gamble failed to
establish that the separate sovereignty doctrine was incorrect or demonstrably erroneous.
Id. at 1989 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1990–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A compound republic, as Justice Ginsburg posits,
connotes the delegation of authority between the federal government and the States was
intended to serve as “double security [for] the rights of the people”—the true sovereigns. See
id. at 1991 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg specifically noted
early American courts disfavored successive prosecutions, even where calling upon
“separate” Federal and State sovereigns. See id. at 1992 (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S.
1, 15 (1820)).
118
119

120
121
122

123
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implicate fundamental constitutional protections.” 124 Specifically, she
pointed to several limiting principles suggesting the “unjust” purposes of
successive prosecutions are well recognized in the legal community. 125

F.

Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion expressing concerns
about the Court’s willingness to readily endorse a massive exception to the
prohibition against double jeopardy. 126 He posited that the Court endorsed
a system where “if all the might of one ‘sovereign’ cannot succeed against
the presumptively free individual, another may insist on the chance to try
again.” 127 Justice Gorsuch traced his rationale for the complete abrogation of
the separate sovereigns doctrine to the historical practices of ancient times,
including the Greeks, Romans, Old Testament, and early days of common
law. 128 Furthermore, he argued that the government proffered no evidence
to suggest the framers intended “same offence” to have a “lawyerly
sovereign-specific meaning.” 129
To illustrate his historical analysis, Justice Gorsuch relied heavily
on court-martial proceedings within the military justice context. 130 This
Id. at 1993 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116
n.5 (2013)).
Id. at 1992, 1995 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg pointed to the DOJ’s use of
its Petite policy to reduce the number of offenses it tries that are “based on substantially the
same act(s) or transaction(s)” as conduct previously tried in state courts, limiting federal
prosecution to cases that left a “substantial federal interest . . . demonstrably unvindicated.”
Id. at 1995 (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.031(A) (rev. July 2009)).
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg drew on the fact that over half of the States prohibit successive
prosecution for offenses previously resolved in either state or federal courts. Id. (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
124

125

126
127
128

Id.
Id. Justice Gorsuch points to these three historical periods as key sources in the

development of American government and law. First, Justice Gorsuch notes that the law in
ancient Athens established that “man could not be tried twice for the same offense.” Id.
(citing ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS 195 (1927)).
Next, the Old Testament teachings also supported this bar to the practice of double jeopardy.
Id. (citing ZACHARY NUGENT BROOKE & CHRISTOPHER N. L. BROOKE, THE ENGLISH
CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 204–05 n.1 (1931)). Last, early common law stated that to
“‘punish a man twice over for one offence’ would be deeply unjust.” Id. (quoting 1 FREDRICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448 (2d ed.
1898)).
Id. at 1998 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Gorsuch points to the fact that,
in 1786, a congressional committee promoted federal authority over import duties so as to
prevent “thirteen separate authorities” from “ordain[ing] various penalties for the same
offence.” Id. (quoting 30 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 440 (J.
Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)).
Id. at 1998, 2003–04. First, Justice Gorsuch points to a Continental Congress resolution
from 1778, which declared no person can be tried in state court “for the same offense, for
129

130

2020]

GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES

179

illustration added fodder to his argument that, upon adoption of the Fifth
Amendment in 1791, a multiplicity of common law authorities supported
the convention that “a prosecution in any court, so long as the court had
jurisdiction over the offense, was enough to bar future re-prosecution in
another court.” 131 Justice Gorsuch took issue with the Court’s reliance on
stare decisis, while it wholly ignored the Constitution “as originally adopted
and understood,” to prohibit successive federal and state prosecutions. 132 He
argued that the early nineteenth century cases precipitating the separate
sovereigns doctrine were decided by narrow margins. 133 Ultimately, Justice
Gorsuch concluded there is no doubt that “the benefits the framers saw in
prohibiting double prosecutions remain real, and maybe more vital than
ever, today.” 134
IV.

ANALYSIS

Gamble reaffirmed a misguided line of modern precedent that
indiscriminately followed stare decisis rationales. Such blind adherence
solidified a major loss for the individual rights of everyday Americans and,
more specifically, the rights of American service members. As the appellate
defense divisions of the various service branches argued in their amicus
brief, “the separate-sovereigns exception not only allows another bite at the
apple after a state trial: it slices the apple into ‘bite sized’ pieces for the
government,” by allowing military prosecutors to effectively alter the final
verdict of a state court jury. 135 Early proponents of the separate sovereigns
doctrine likely could not have anticipated such a scenario. This construction
allows the orders of legally unqualified commanders to abrogate a service
which he had previous thereto been tried by a Court Martial,” and vice versa. Id. at 1998
(quoting 10 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 72 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)).
Justice Gorsuch also refers to an early, foundational case, Houston v. Moore, to establish
that where there is concurrent jurisdiction between courts “the sentence of either Court,
either of conviction or acquittal, might be [later] pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the
other.” Id. at 2004 (quoting Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 31 (1820)).
Id. at 2000 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 2005.
See id. at 2007. Justice Gorsuch stressed that Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United
States were decided by 5-to-4 and 6-to-3 margins, respectively. See 359 U.S. 121 (1959); 359
U.S. 187 (1959). He then argued this precedent was eroded by subsequent decisions of the
Court. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 793 (1969)).
Id. at 2009. Where governments may utilize multiple prosecutions “it is ‘the poor and the
weak,’ and the unpopular and controversial, who suffer first.” Id. (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S.
at 163 (Black, J., dissenting)).
Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Defense Division et al. as Amici Curia
Supporting Petitioner at 2, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (No. 17-646)
[hereinafter Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps].
131
132
133

134

135
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member’s liberty. 136 Where a commander seeks their own preferred charges
as a second avenue towards so-called justice, Gamble now affirms that he or
she may effectively circumvent the prior state or federal jury
determination. 137 This affirmation is particularly concerning because
deference to the jury’s factfinding role is a bedrock principle of the
American legal system. 138 There is no legitimate proposition upon which the
separate sovereigns doctrine, permitting successive prosecutions through a
court-martial, should be tolerated. The overlap between state and military
systems are minimal and, to some degree, anachronistic. 139 As such, this
development has dangerous implications for service members who find
themselves charged with crimes in state or federal courts.
This part will first examine the prudential development of the
military court-martial system, its double jeopardy understanding, and its
interaction with the civilian judicial system. Next, this part will analyze the
pragmatic dangers of successive prosecutions in military courts, resulting
from the structural dissimilarities inherent in the military justice scheme.
Furthermore, I argue that by allowing the separate sovereigns doctrine to
apply in court-martial proceedings, service members face a compounded
loss of rights that is detrimental to broader notions of justice and liberty.
Finally, this part analyzes the negative impact this doctrine has on individual
service members through the posture of Greening—a recent Navy courtmartial proceeding that doubled the accused’s sentence through the
weaponization of the double jeopardy exception to the detriment of the
sailor’s liberty and security. 140

A.

Understanding the Framers’ Intent

As noted above, the isolation of the military justice system was
intentional. The founders believed the governance of the military required
radically different standards than those of civil society. 141 “[T]his concern
See Jaafari, supra note 2 (explaining that the military commanders in charge of courtmartial proceedings often have little or no legal background or training and lack ethical
oversight akin to a state or military bar).
Of particular concern is the fact that many military judges have asserted that the armed
forces have a protected interest in trying those cases where a state court has handed down a
sentence that it considers improper or overly lenient. They also claim that victims’ families
are vindicated through successive court-martial proceedings because they “ensur[e] justice is
served.” Id.
Harold P. Weinberger, Norman C. Simon, and Samantha V. Ettari, Kramer Levin Naftalis
& Frankel LLP, Civil Jury Trials (Federal), WESTLAW PRACTICAL L. (2019), File. No. w-0205711.
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 4.
See generally No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2018).
I am analyzing framer’s intent not because they were great expositors of individuals’ rights
and liberties at the time they drafted the Constitution, but to provide a comprehensive
136

137

138

139
140
141
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and its attendant preferences continues to the present day.” 142 Original
understandings of common law court-martial jurisdiction were intended to
be incredibly narrow and did not permit jurisdiction over offenses against
civilians without some military nexus—which invariably prevented instances
of double jeopardy. 143 It was not until 1863, nearly a century after the
enactment of the Articles of War, that Congress permitted court-martial
proceedings against “soldiers, in wartime, for civil crimes.” 144 At that time, it
was universally understood there was no utility in trying a service member
for a civil crime where a competent state or federal court had jurisdiction to
do so. 145

1.

English Common Law & the Constitutional Convention

The United States brand of military justice was structured to parallel
many of the practices and principles ingrained in English common law. In
particular, the writings of Blackstone served as a source of inspiration as to
the structural understanding of military court-martial proceedings. 146
Blackstone’s commentaries stated that “[t]he necessity of order and
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance.” 147 He
expounded that:
This discretionary power of the court martial is indeed to
be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with
regard to military offences, has almost an absolute
legislative power. “His majesty,” says the act, “may form
articles of war, and constitute courts martial, with power to
try any crime by such articles, and inflict penalties by
sentence or judgment of the same.” A vast and most
important trust! an unlimited power to create crimes, and
annex to them any punishments, not extending to life or
limb! These are indeed forbidden to be inflicted, except
for crimes declared to be so punishable by this act; which
crimes we have just enumerated, and among which we may

understanding of the original interplay between the separate military justice complex and
double jeopardy conceptions. There is little doubt this doctrine has developed and evolved
along with modern society, which I seek to address in later sections of this article.
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 4.
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 29.
See id. at 30 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 n.42 (1957)) (emphasis omitted).
142
143
144
145
146

See id.
See Margulies, supra note 58, at 332.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS
*413 (1753), http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2140/Blackstone_1387-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2HK-8NTT].
147
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observe that any disobedience to lawful commands is
one. 148
Quite aptly, Blackstone noted his concerns related to the broad expansion
of the military courts’ power to try a comprehensive range of cases. 149 It is
this skepticism that informed the framers in fashioning a similar system in
the emerging nation. 150
The English system recognized the importance of housing the
armed forces under Parliament—the functional equivalent of Congress—and
the value in allowing that body to determine what could be tried by courtmartial. 151 In replicating this structure, the United States Congress housed
the power to regulate the armed forces under Clause Fourteen. 152 Though
the framers were less concerned with the individual rights and liberties of
American service members, 153 it is unlikely they contemplated service
members being subject to double jeopardy without concern.
Early discussions surrounding the origin of the Fifth Amendment’s
language led to a debate as to whether to include certain phrasing to clarify
the meaning of “same offense.” 154 Congressmember George Partridge, Jr. 155
proposed the inclusion of the phrase “by any law of the United States,”
though this language was omitted from the final text and did not indicate the
general mindset of the congressional populace at the time of its
conception. 156
Furthermore, notes from the Continental Congress recognized that:
[N]o person shall be tried in any Court of Judicature for
the same offence, for which he had previous thereto been
tried by a Court Martial; or be arrested or called to trial by
a Court Martial for any offense not expressly made
148
149

Id. at *415–16.
Id. at *417.

Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries
and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY
150

L. REV. 1195, 1219 (Mar. 2014) (“The text is consistent with English commentary at the time
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights; Blackstone argued against greater jurisdiction for the
military courts and emphasized that they should be used only at times of war for order and
discipline in the army.”).
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996).
Id. at 767.
See LURIE, supra note 13, at 3.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789).
Representative George Partridge, Jr. served as an officer and minuteman during the
Revolutionary War in addition to holding his position as a delegate in the House of
Representatives for the state of Massachusetts. The First Federal Congress: Representative
George
Partridge,
GEO.
WASH.
UNIV.,
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p1/members/reps/
partridge.html
[https://perma.cc/2HET-YALJ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2019),
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789).
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cognizable before them, or for which the offender may be
under arrest, indictment or imprisonment by a civil
authority. 157
There can be no more explicit recognition that, though early conceptions
of the military justice system did not advocate for the full swath of protected
liberties for service members, protections against double jeopardy were of
paramount importance from the start. Through discovery and
development, these protected liberties became more widely recognized.
Now, any abdication of these protections is an affront to the military justice
system's purpose as a whole.

2.

Differentiating Military Courts as Article I Courts

The military justice system, in its general capacity, is granted the
ability to exercise jurisdiction over a broad array of criminal cases, as
permitted by Article I of the Constitution. 158 Article I, Section Eight, Clause
Fourteen of the Constitution, which grants plenary powers to Congress “[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces,” permits trying a service member through court-martial proceedings
solely based on the accused’s status as a military member. 159
Examinations into the administration of court-martial proceedings
indicate, at common law, these proceedings were not intended to exercise
judicial power in the same manner as civilian courts because they are
inherently creatures of the military. 160 As Colonel Frederick Wiener argued,
military justice must be malleable to accommodate the liberty and due
process interests afforded to civilian defendants while simultaneously
allowing for the capacity to “respond to the needs of military command and
control.” 161 Thus, while governed by a different article (congressional control
through Article I), the protections afforded to civilian defendants should not
be depleted in the military context.

B.

Successive Prosecutions in Military Courts

Despite the practice of discrete separation between civilian and
military proceedings, recent developments have integrated the systems to
permit the unjust expansion of successive prosecutions and “rob[] the old
157
158

10 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 72 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)).

See ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34697, SUPREME COURT APPELLATE

JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY COURT CASES (2009).
Solorio v. U.S., 483 U.S. 435, 438 (1987).
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and Judicial Power of the United
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 754 (2004).
See id. at 755 (citing Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the
First Mutiny Act’s Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1989)).
159
160

161
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rule of significan[ce].” 162 Because court-martial jurisdiction has become
“even more expansive than the general federal criminal jurisdiction,” it has
provided military prosecutors unfettered authority to bring cases against
military members under the cover of the UCMJ, even if a trial has already
concluded in state or federal court. 163 Not only does this support a complete
degradation of the protections against double jeopardy for service members,
it also impermissibly expands the separate sovereigns doctrine to
incorporate a jurisdiction never intended to hold the same degree of
authority.

1.

Use in Practice

Poor regulations characterize the management of court-martial
jurisdiction over criminal acts involving the same general offenses that were
previously brought in state courts. 164 This practice is a particularly vexing
issue as none of the military branches keep records regarding previously
tried civilian cases. 165 Because there is “no military-wide regulation restricting
the ability of military convening authorities,” senior-ranking officers,
typically with little to no legal training, are tasked with “conven[ing] a
successive court-martial.” 166 As a result, the subsequent trials of service
members previously tried in state or federal courts fly under the radar
without significant scrutiny.
The Departments of the Army and the Air Force do not keep
records of how often they conduct successive court-martial proceedings, but
the Navy has consistently held approximately two per year. 167 The deficiency
in the records suggests an indifference on behalf of the military branches
that is quite disturbing considering the gravity of the liberty interest at stake
when service members are subject to successive proceedings—court-martial
or otherwise. However, those in favor of successive court-martial
proceedings contend there are other limiting mechanisms to prevent
rampant abuse by government prosecutors.
One purported mechanism arises in Blockburger v. United
States, 168 where the Court developed a test (the Blockburger test) to be

See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 32 (citing Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)).
Id. at 31–33.
Id. at 5. See also Jaafari, supra note 2.
See Jaafari, supra note 2 (“It’s unclear how often the military tries service members on
charges already adjudicated in civilian courts.”).
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 5 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 82
(1985)).
See id. at 6–7.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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applied where two similar statutes govern the same conduct. 169 The
Blockburger test is a pseudo-limiting mechanism applying in all contexts
where there may be successive prosecutions. 170 It requires that, where the
transaction results from two statutory provisions, they must each require
proof of a separate and distinct element. 171 Where a single act violates
multiple statutes, and each requires additional facts, the accused is not
exempt from prosecution or punishment under both statutes. 172
The intention of the Blockburger test was to prevent prosecutors
from continuously trying a defendant by charging lesser included offenses
until they finally secured a conviction. 173 However, the separate sovereigns
doctrine, coupled with the good order and discipline provision, has had the
opposite effect in the military context. 174 Because so many UCMJ crimes
mandate the crime also be prejudicial to good order and discipline or bring
disrepute upon the armed forces, it is easy to meet the requirements of the
Blockburger test. 175
An article within the UCMJ proscribes the ability to try an accused
a second time for the same offense, but the statute is internally facing. 176
Despite this structure, safeguards to protect against the abuse of successive
trials in a military context are severely limited. The Department of Defense
(DOD) does not have a procedure akin to the Petite Policy issued by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to limit when use of successive prosecution is
appropriate. 177 In contrast, the DOJ explicitly calls for the sparing use of
successive prosecutions as a general rule in civilian courts. 178 The DOJ Petite
policy specifically states:
In order to insure the most efficient use of law enforcement
resources, whenever a matter involves overlapping federal
and state jurisdiction, federal prosecutors should, as soon
Id. at 304. However, scholars have noted that the Blockburger test does not necessarily
stand for the principle of “sameness” that has often been attributed to it by various courts.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 943 YALE FAC. SCHOLARSHIP
SERIES 1807, 1807 n.3 (1997).
See Poulin, supra note 28, at 1213.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
169

170
171

Id.
See Maj. Daniel J. Everett, Double, Double Toil and Trouble: An Invitation for Regaining
Double Jeopardy Symmetry in Courts-Martial, ARMY L. 6, 13 (2011).
Id.
See e.g., Droddy, supra note 35, at 95.
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175

“Internally facing” refers to the idea that the prohibition against successive prosecutions,
as outlined in the UCMJ, means that there may not be two court-martial proceedings for the
same offense, referred to as Former Jeopardy. 10 U.S.C. § 844, art. 44 (2019).
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 15–16.
ADAM HARRIS KURLAND, SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: THE DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 3–4
(2001).
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as possible, consult with their state counterparts to
determine the most appropriate single forum in which to
proceed to satisfy the substantial federal and state interests
involved, and, if possible, to resolve all criminal liability for
the acts in question. 179
The policy effectively and substantially curtails the number of successive
cases brought between traditional federal and state courts. However, because
there is no parallel provision recognized by the DOD, no authority governs
a military prosecutor’s discretion to bring or bar successive court-martial
proceedings. A system devoid of such oversight creates a perfect situation for
abuse by those who wish to use military tribunals to take a second bite at the
apple.

2.

Article 134 & Assimilation

Another mechanism providing a practical loophole to the “same
offense” bar is Article 134 of the UCMJ—otherwise known as the “general
article.” Article 134 functions as a catch-all provision to try crimes not
otherwise articulated. 180 Pragmatically, it provides another avenue to
distinguish common federal or state crimes from those separately triable by
government prosecutors during court-martial proceedings.
The purpose behind Article 134 is to capture “all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces”
and to encompass all conduct that could bring discredit upon the armed
forces. 181 This conception harkens back to the idea that an offense tried by
military tribunals should have some military-applicable component tied to
it. 182 Following the recent revision to the UCMJ in 2018, an even greater
array of crimes may fall within the ambit of those “garden-variety crimes”
that are apt to have duplicative state court trials. 183 This revision is
particularly dangerous in light of the “heightened degree of state and military
cooperation” of late. 184
The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act (FACA) is a facet of Article
134, permitting the military prosecution of a state crime if it could be
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-92000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals [https://perma.cc/L6QJUNMK].
10 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2019).
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183

Id.
See e.g., LURIE, supra note 13, at 6.
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 32.

“Military criminal investigators typically work very closely with state investigators when
crimes involve both jurisdictions.” See id. at 33 (quoting Maj. Charles L. Prichard, Jr., The
184

Pit and the Pendulum: Why the Military Must Change its Policy Regarding Successive StateMilitary Prosecutions, 414 ARMY LAW. 1, 16 (2007)).
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charged through the FACA. 185 This Act sidesteps the Blockburger issue by
incorporating the “prejudice of good order and discipline” and the
“bring[ing] discredit upon the armed forces” elements to satisfy conviction
under Article 134. 186
Because the military and state often have concurrent jurisdiction
over land where a base is settled, a person who commits an offense on that
land may open him or herself up to vulnerabilities of prosecution, both from
the state court and military court-martial proceedings. In other words, a
person who commits an offense on that land may open him or herself up
to vulnerabilities of dual prosecutions if the crime is subject to assimilation
under the FACA. The only difference—though of utmost importance under
Blockburger—between the two trials would be the incorporation of the
“good order and discipline” and the “to bring discredit upon the armed
forces” provisions of the general article. 187 Any suggestion that this satisfies
the Blockburger test and does not implicate a double jeopardy violation
requires an act of mental gymnastics. This language effectively provides a
workaround to allow military tribunals to bring a broader range of charges
in court-martial proceedings without offending the Blockburger test or the
Fifth Amendment.

C.

Compounding Effect of Loss of Rights

Not only is there a sense of unease in the ability to try an individual
twice for the same general offense in a military court-martial, but these trials
also have a compounding effect that may lead to a greater loss of individual
rights. Due in large part to early conceptions regarding the military justice
system’s sole purpose of maintaining discipline within the ranks, as opposed
to adjudicating civil crimes, certain general rights and protections are
conspicuously absent from military trials. 188 This section outlines a few of the
key safeguards forming the cornerstone of the traditional civilian trial that
are absent in the military context. The section will argue that this provides
fertile ground for successive prosecution to deplete the bundle of rights that
are generally afforded to criminal defendants. By stripping these safeguards,
defendants are left with limited protective rights when hauled before a
military tribunal.

185
186

See HENNING, supra note 158. See also 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2020).
See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2020).

Under the FACA, state law is applicable to conduct occurring on federal land. See id.
However, through the inclusion of the “good order and discipline” and “to bring discredit
upon the armed forces” elements of Article 134, a state law could be construed as a separate,
federal offense that could be separately tried. See 10 U.S.C. 934 (1950).
See, e.g., LURIE, supra note 13, at 6.
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Lack of Impartiality

Generally, adjudicators are presumed to be impartial and apolitical
to ensure their decision is both fair and unbiased. 189 However, because courtmartial proceedings fall squarely outside the strictures imposed on Article
III adjudicators, there is no guarantee of impartiality in the routine
dispensation of justice.
Where a person is tried in a successive trial for the same offense, it
is dangerous to haul him or her before an adjudicator who has no mandate
to remain impartial like an Article III judge. 190 The punitive consequences
are akin to those of the prior prosecution in state court; therefore, there is
no decreased risk to offset the eroded protections. Compounding matters,
the military judiciary is dependent on the executive and Congress; therefore,
those who adjudicate these matters cannot be considered impartial decisionmakers. 191
Military judges are not siloed from politics and partiality in the same
way civilian court judges are; they are still subject to promotion and
command influence. 192 With such incentives looming over their heads,
military judges may be tempted to overlook procedural protections for
defendants in an effort to please superiors and convening authorities. 193 It is
entirely conceivable these superiors may desire to bring a successive
prosecution and direct a verdict in contravention of what justice would
require. 194 This danger increases tenfold where a defendant was acquitted in
state court, yet both Congress and military command believe justice has not
been served. In such cases, Congress and command may determine that the
accused need to be retried in a different arena to vindicate their
preconceived perceptions of justice.

2.

Jury of Peers Versus Ranking Members

In the military, a jury of your peers representative of the community
does not hold the same meaning as it does in a civilian court. In a courtmartial proceeding, the jury (otherwise known as a “panel”) is comprised of
senior ranking officers. 195 The convening authority is not required to

See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV.
493, 498 (2014).
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 11–12.
See Military Justice and Article III, supra note 71, at 1918–19.
See id. at 1920–21.
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See id.
See id.
See Jaafari, supra note 2.
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“detail” 196 a representative panel by demographics or rank but are, instead,
governed by the strictures of 10 U.S.C. § 825. 197 This distinction fosters a
strong, hierarchical power disparity that can act to the detriment of the
service member being tried. 198
Alternatively, traditional state and federal defendants are ensured a
fundamental constitutional “selection of a petit jury from a representative
cross section of the community.” 199 Without this protection, arbitrary power
could be used to conspire against and disserve marginalized and
disadvantaged defendants by depriving them of liberty and subjecting them
to unfair successive prosecutions. 200

3.

Lack of Unanimity

Finally, there is no requirement in court-martial proceedings that
the panel returns a unanimous verdict, regardless of the offense charged. 201
This unsettling diminution of jury protections gives rise to serious concerns
as to the justice of such convictions. 202
For example, the separate sovereigns doctrine permitted the retrial
of Private Seth Lemasters after he was acquitted in a Virginia state court. 203
The subsequent conviction resulted in a ten-year sentence, in no small part
because the panel was not required to return a unanimous verdict to achieve
a conviction. 204 Essentially, the military is afforded a preview of the strengths
and weaknesses of a case as it proceeded in state court before bringing
effectively the same case in a court-martial proceeding, one where the bar
for conviction is substantially lower. In what alternate universe could this
have been the intention in crafting these separate adjudicatory systems?

The term “detail” typically means to form or convene a temporary, ad hoc group of service
members for a particular mission. Therefore, a group detailed to a court-martial panel is
tasked with the mission of dispensing justice. See Glossary, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMM’N,
https://www.mc.mil/LEGALRESOURCES/Glossary.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P4TBWRQK].
10 U.S.C. § 825 (2018). The principal strictures require that a defendant who is a
commissioned officer be tried by a panel of commissioned officers. Id. Enlisted defendants,
for their part, may not be tried by members of their own unit or by a panel with fewer than
one-third enlisted members, of which none may be junior in rank to the defendant. Id.
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 7–8.
See id. at 11 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)).
See id.; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 698 (1975).
See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 8–9.
See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 936.
Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 11–12 (citing United States v.
Lemasters, No. 20111143, 2013 WL 6913001, at *1–2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2013)).
Id. at 13.
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D. United States v. Greening
The poignant example of Austin Greening throws the dangers of
court-martial proceedings into sharp relief. Austin Greening, a former sailor
for the United States Naval forces, was loading and unloading firearms in
his apartment in the presence of his friend and fellow sailor, Gunner’s Mate
Third Class (GM3) K.K. 205 While GM3 K.K. was attempting to hand
Greening one of the loaded pistols, Greening accidentally allowed the pistol
to discharge, and a round subsequently struck GM3 K.K. just below his left
eye, killing him. 206 Greening was charged with murder in a Virginia state
court in 2013. 207
During his initial civilian proceeding in August 2013, Greening was
indicted for second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission
of a felony. 208 He was initially convicted of both crimes but was later retried
upon discovery that the Commonwealth’s medical examiner disclosed
erroneous information to the court, bringing into question the veracity of
the original conviction. 209 Thereafter, Greening entered into a plea
agreement where he plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter, accepting a
sentence of three years of confinement with two years, six months
suspended. 210 Ultimately, Greening served seven weeks in jail before being
released on September 9, 2015. 211 The very next day, Greening was taken
into pretrial confinement by naval authorities, and court-martial charges
were proffered two weeks later. 212
Throughout his civilian trial, Greening’s command continued to
send him Administrative Marks, informing him that he would be
“voluntarily” extended beyond his scheduled service due to his prospective
court-martial proceedings. 213 Upon release from civilian confinement, naval
commanders proffered charges against Greening for murder under the
UCMJ. 214
Greening was then tried by a military judge, by general courtmartial, who convicted him of involuntary manslaughter and obstruction of
justice in violation of Articles 119 and 134 of the UCMJ. 215 He was sentenced
See United States v. Greening, No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. Mar. 30, 2018). See also Jaafari, supra note 2.
See Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1.
See Jaafari, supra note 2.
Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32, 18.2-53.1 (2018)).

205

206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id.
See id.; Jaafari, supra note 2.
Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 n.6 (2018).
Id. at *2.
See Jaafari, supra note 2.
Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1.
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to forty-two months of confinement, subject to reduced pay, and a
dishonorable discharge. 216
On appeal, Greening proffered two arguments: (1) the government
lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to untimely action in releasing
him from active duty and (2) the Navy violated his Fifth Amendment due
process rights by failing to provide notice that he was being held
involuntarily on active duty. 217 Ultimately, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the court-martial findings and sentence. 218
Not only does this result add to the litany of unjust precedent
permitting the stripping of service members’ rights, but it also sanctions their
unconstitutional, successive prosecutions. 219 Attorneys from various service
branches filed appeals against the government during the review of this case
to advocate for the principle that “those who serve[] our country receive the
proper double jeopardy protections of the Constitution,” which they note is
the “basic charter of rights to which they took an oath to defend with their
lives.” 220 How can service members risk their lives to defend a Constitution
that takes no strides to protect their own?
V.

IMPLEMENTATION OF LIMITING PRINCIPLES

In light of the compounding effect on the loss of rights that service
members subjected to successive prosecutions face, this part seeks to offer
a handful of limiting principles to reduce and eliminate the use of military
tribunals as a workaround to better-postured prosecutions. Even though
Gamble permits the application of the separate sovereigns doctrine to the
Double Jeopardy Clause, these limitations can help ensure military
members do not find themselves helpless in the face of an unjust and
historically improvident decision.
First, I argue for the implementation of a military-specific Petite
Policy to govern the appropriate use of successive prosecutions and to
provide much-needed DOD oversight. A Petite Policy would establish
guidelines as to which cases the DOD could reasonably permit a successive
prosecution predicated on substantially the same act as the first. 221 Second,
I argue for enhanced restrictions on the use of the general article in bringing
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5.
See Jaafari, supra note 2.
Id. As Greg T. Rinckey—former Army judge advocate and founding partner of Tully
Rinckey firm—aptly stated, “It smells bad . . . It smells like double jeopardy.” Id.
Presently, DOJ prosecutors look to the Petite Policy to guide their decision as to whether
216
217
218
219
220

221

to bring a federal case against a defendant for substantially the same act prosecuted in state
court. Though there is no statutory bar precluding federal prosecutors from calling for a
successive prosecution, the DOJ places a self-imposed restraint on bringing such cases unless
a “substantial federal interest” needs vindication. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179.
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successive prosecutions. Finally, I implore the military justice system to seek
alternatives to this practice and increase its standards to prevent unfettered
abuse to the detriment of military justice, military discipline, and the
American legal system as a whole.

A.

Formation of a Department of Defense “Petite” Policy

This section provides an insight into the benefits of adopting a
military-specific Petite Policy that could dictate under what conditions, if
ever, it would be appropriate to permit a successive prosecution through
court-martial proceedings. This Petite Policy would mirror the DOJ’s
policy, which requires a careful examination of the utility in trying an
individual again, in a different forum, for effectively the same offense. 222 Not
only would this practice require the DOD to apply greater scrutiny to its
generally permissive view of supplemental military jurisdiction subsequent
to a state court proceeding, but it would also provide clear guidelines to
ensure just outcomes are achieved in the greatest number of cases.

1.

DOD Oversight of Successive Prosecutions

The first step in reconstructing the military justice system requires
implementing a strategy like the DOJ’s Petite Policy. This policy would
prescribe administrative limitations on what cases, and in what context, the
separate branches could choose to pursue successive prosecution.
If the policy seeks to mirror the DOJ policy, it would need to
prevent the initiation or continuation of court-martial proceedings where the
act in question was “substantially the same act or transaction” as the act
already adjudicated in state or federal court, unless the prior proceeding left
a “substantial [military-specific] interest [] unvindicated.” 223 As with the DOJ
version, the DOD would be required to pursue a calculated comparison of
the factual scenarios, bringing the offense under the domain of each
respective jurisdiction. This would ensure any decision to move forward on
a previously tried case would be grounded on careful, case-by-case
considerations, an analysis that accounts for the fundamental utility and
fairness of multiple prosecutions.

2.

Proposed Requirements

I propose the factors established in the DOJ policy be incorporated
into routine practice for military tribunals. Specifically, three prerequisites
must be satisfied. First, the matter must involve a substantial military
222
223

See id.
See KURLAND, supra note 178, at 5 (citing DEP’T

2.031(A) (2018)).

OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE

MANUAL § 9-
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interest. 224 Second, the prior prosecution must have left that interest
demonstrably unvindicated. 225 Third, the government must believe the
defendant’s conduct constitutes a military-specific offense that is likely to
result in a conviction based on admissible evidence. 226
Ultimately, such requirements should have a demonstrable impact
on the present figures associated with the prevalence of successive
prosecutions. 227 Moreover, a military-specific Petite Policy will likely
decrease the number of proposed successive prosecutions as well. 228 This
degree of oversight, and the clarity gained from adhering to a written policy,
could further bolster the rights of military service members and help ensure
they are fully protected from double jeopardy considering the Gamble
decision.

B.

Restriction on Use of Article 134 Charges

By using the separate sovereigns doctrine framework, the military
code has found a means by which to incorporate a catchall article that may
also implement state violations into the charging scheme. Since the
Supreme Court decided Parker v. Levy, 229 it has placed limits on the reach
of Article 134, which requires all charges include actual conduct detrimental
to “good order and discipline,” though the scope of this provision is still in
doubt. 230 This doubt also manifests in the capacity to abuse successive
prosecutions and threaten double jeopardy interests. This section seeks to
limit the use of such an article to strategically minimize service member
protections against successive prosecution.

1.

The Guise of Good Order and Discipline

Practitioners have noted a marked diminution of the good order
and discipline rationale, which has transformed itself into the quintessential
“we don’t like something but don’t want to explain why” element. 231 No
standardized definition exists for the term, which has permitted its
224
225
226
227
228

See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179.
See id.
See id.
See HENNING, supra note 158, at 1–2 n.2.
The DOJ’s Petite policy requires federal prosecutors to analyze the claim based on three

substantive prerequisites, and it encourages the use of a single forum, thereby inherently
reducing the number of proposed successive prosecutions. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 179. If the DOD chose to implement a similar policy, then the likely outcome would
be a reduction in both actual and proposed successive prosecutions.
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, USAF, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and
Discipline?, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123, 136 (2017).
Id. at 165.
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widespread abuse by commanders. 232 Such abuses have led modern
Congressional leaders like Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to advocate for
reforms that remove these commanders from decision-making processes
that allow them to tout “good order and discipline” as a justification for their
decisions. 233 Specifically, Gillibrand stated to the Washington Post:
The Defense Department tells us that if 3 percent of the
most senior commanders don’t have the sole authority to
decide whether a person accused of rape should be
prosecuted, we will lose good order and discipline in our
military. That same argument was used against integrating
the services; against allowing women to serve; against
repealing don’t ask, don’t tell; and against allowing women
in combat. It wasn’t true then, and it isn’t true now. 234
Attempts at reform have proven fruitless in recent decades. But, as
Gillibrand impliedly supported, there is no evidence that permitting such
offenses to be heard in civilian courts alone has negatively impacted the
military's ability to preserve “good order and discipline.” 235

2.

Prohibition on Bringing Successive Article 134 Claims

Rather than permit the continued expansion of the use of this
article, the system must be amenable to the Pentagon’s proposed reforms
to the scope of its use. 236 Specifically, there must be an overall prohibition
on the use of Article 134 in bringing successive prosecutions for crimes
already tried in state court so as to not offend the double jeopardy
protections that service members necessarily must retain.
If a blanket prohibition were imposed, this would require
government prosecutors to designate the offense in a clear, offense-specific
article of the UCMJ and MCM. This would ensure the use of a statutorily
demonstrable standard that the military branches are required to publish
for members to recognize and understand. Superimposing a federal or state
offense into the catch-all, Article 134, not only facially suggests that there is
weak justification in bringing a successive prosecution but also adds a
military element to an otherwise wholly ordinary offense. This practice
undermines the legitimacy of the military justice system and can be thwarted
One example concerning the abuse of this general article included the court-martial of an
Army physician for refusing to conduct dermatology training for Special Forces members
and for making anti-war statements to enlisted members. Thus, the use of the article runs the
gamut. See id. at 133 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).
Id. at 167–68 (referring to military members resistance in accepting women’s eligibility to
serve in combat).
Id. at 169 (quoting Kirsten Gillibrand, Justice for Military Victims of Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST, May 27, 2016, at A17).
See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 968–69.
See Weber, supra note 230, at 165.
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early on through a military-specific Petite Policy—particularly, where the
government is seeking to bring a charge under Article 134. This policy will
assuredly reduce the number of successive prosecutions and simultaneously
preserve service members’ double jeopardy protections.

C.

Increased Standards for Successive Convictions

While not perfect, the civilian system for limiting the number and
types of successive prosecutions is a model the military justice system must
look to in driving back its overuse of such successive prosecutions. 237 First,
the reforms may be balanced against the current use of the civilian Petite
Policy, limiting the time and capacity in which successive prosecutions
before distinct sovereigns may be brought. 238
There must also be a diametric shift away from the overexpansion
of military court-martial jurisdiction to combat this dangerous practice. One
possible solution would be to return to the system originally conceived by
the framers, 239 providing special solicitude to these tribunals to try militaryspecific offenses—not the full gamut of civilian crimes.
Take the case of Greening, for example. If the DOD had adopted
a military-specific Petite Policy, DOD officers would have been tasked with
first identifying a substantial military interest that had been left unvindicated
in the state court proceeding. In this case, the interest espoused by Naval
prosecutors appeared to be colored by the victim’s family’s dissatisfaction
with the length of the state court sentence. 240 As a result, it is highly unlikely
that this rationale would pass muster as a legitimate “substantial military
interest.” If for some reason DOD officers did find such an interest, officers
would have been left to determine what interest was left demonstrably
unvindicated. While there may have been an argument for the forthright
application of justice due to the divulgence of erroneous information that
led to a retrial, the retrial that was conducted in state court would appear to
have directly vindicated this interest. Thus, the second rationale for the
application would have also fallen short. Finally, DOD officers would then
have had to fit the act within the framework of a military offense; a simple
task under the facts in Greening, given that the UCMJ has a specific article
outlining the elements of murder as well as involuntary manslaughter. 241
Consequently, the third prerequisite would have been easily met—even
where the first two fell short. Hence, a military-specific Petite Policy would
likely have entirely prevented the successive prosecution in Greening’s case.
237
238
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240
241

See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 14–16.
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179.
See Hirschhorn, supra note 55, at 210–13.
See Vergakis, supra note 3.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 918–919 (2018).
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Furthermore, there is no question that neither murder nor
involuntary manslaughter are military-specific offenses. 242 Competent state
courts may try them without requiring the military to step on a state court’s
toes to right a self-declared wrong. Were a limit that pared down the use of
military courts for nonmilitary-related offenses to be imposed, Greening
would never have been hauled before the military judge after already serving
his state-imposed sentence.
While the military justice system is certainly an important and
necessary facet of the armed forces, using it to circumvent outcomes in other
jurisdictions is a complete usurpation of justice. Substantially more just
outcomes result where civilian courts and military courts remain sufficiently
separate and successive prosecutions are altogether abandoned.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Gamble—upholding the separate
sovereigns doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
on stare decisis grounds—may have maintained the modern jurisprudential
status quo, but it further entrenched a system that continually undermines
the liberty and protections of military service members. 243 While the Court’s
attempt to play it safe may have little practical impact on traditional civilian
prosecutions, the same cannot be said for military justice institutions that do
not have the same type of limiting safeguards. The Court’s refusal to give
credence to the practical rationales behind the separation of the military
justice system and the benefits of maintaining some degree of isolation to
prevent abuse and disruption diminishes the authority and legitimacy of the
court-martial process in its entirety. The system is fundamentally flawed if it
permits young men and women to die in a fight to protect a set of
Constitutional liberties that they themselves are deliberately and specifically
denied.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103(a) (2020); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-103 (2020); GA. CODE § 16-5-3 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(a) (2020);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1 (2020).
See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1979–80 (2019).
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